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AWILL IAM WHEWELL’S SEMANTIC
ACCOUNT OF INDUCTION
Corey Dethier
WilliamWhewell’s account of induction differs dramatically from the one familiar from
twentieth-century debates. I argue that Whewell’s induction can be usefully understood
by comparing the difference between his views and more standard accounts to contem-
porary debates between semantic and syntactic views of theories: rather than under-
standing inductive inference as capturing a relationship between sentences or proposi-
tions, Whewell understands it as a method for constructing a model of the world. The
difference between this (“semantic”) view and the more familiar (“syntactic”) picture of
induction is reﬂected in other aspects of Whewell’s philosophy of science, particularly
his treatment of consilience and the order of discovery.Ha
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ll uWhat is meant by success in these cases? To this we reply, that our inquiry
must be, whether the facts have the same relation in the hypothesis which
they have in reality. (William Whewell 1840/2014b, 210)1. Introduction
To contemporary eyes, William Whewell’s use of the term “induction” is idio-
syncratic: it involves “superinducing” an “ideal conception” (sometimes, a “hy-
pothesis”) onto the empirical facts in order to connect them together (1840/
2014a, 42). On Whewell’s view, this process of combining the right active
“idea” with passive “sensations” (26) is the method “by which the sciences nowContact Corey Dethier at the Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy
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Aexisting among men have been constructed” (1849, 12–13). This atypical char-
acterization of induction has inspired a variety of readings. Mill (1868/2012,
506), for instance, ascribes toWhewell the view that induction is merely the “try-
ing of hypothesis after hypothesis until one is found which ﬁts the phenomena,”
while Achinstein (2010, 729) sums up more recent commenters on Whewell
as “a disparate group [of philosophers] who classify him as one of their own, as
a hypothetico-deductivist, a defender of inference to the best explanation, a
Quinean holist, or even a Kantian a priorist.”
As Snyder (2008, 182) has noted, however, one of the common themes of
this literature has been a skepticism about just how inductive Whewell’s “in-
duction” really is. Thus, Buchdahl (1991, 313) characterizes Whewell’s view as
“very much in the spirit of the kind of methodology espoused in our time by
the Popperian dynamic approach. . . . Any ‘logical’ movement that exists here
is entirely from hypotheses to the data.” Similarly, Butts (1967, 182) argues that
in Whewell’s writings, “induction” simply refers to the hypothetico-deductive
method. Fisch (1991, 110) considers Whewell’s “induction” to be essentially
Peirce’s “abduction” and approvingly quotes W. H. Davis’s claim that, on this
Peircean view, “scientiﬁc reasoning does not depend upon induction at all! ” (109).
And Achinstein (1992, 358) himself takes (or at least took) a similar interpre-
tative position, arguing that Whewell’s consilience is a form of inference to the
best explanation rather than induction properly so called.
By contrast, I am convinced by Snyder’s (2008, 219–20) argument that while
Whewell does embrace certain elements of idealism in his broader “antithetical”
epistemology, reading his inductive method as a form of hypothetico-deductivism
or IBE (inference to the best explanation) would be a mistake.1 The confusion
stems, Synder argues, from an overly restrictive understanding of induction
owed to twentieth-century debates between Millian inductivists and hypothetico-
deductivists, debates that make it seem as though the Millian picture of induc-
tion is the only possible one (221). I think Snyder is correct: Whewell does have
a markedly different view of induction than that normally found in contempo-
rary accounts, and better understanding the contrast between Whewell’s view
and a standard twentieth-century picture can help us better understand not only
this vision of induction but Whewell’s epistemology more broadly. In this essay,
I develop the contrast more explicitly using a comparison to debates over the na-
ture of theories: Whewell differs from twentieth-century views on induction in1. The issue here is not whether Whewell recognizes hypothetico-deductive reasoning or inference
to the best explanation as legitimate but whether Whewell understands induction in a manner that we
might identify with these methods. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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Amuch the same way that the semanticist differs from the defender of syntactic
views.
I begin by brieﬂy laying out Whewell’s general epistemology of science.
Then, bringing together recent work by Snyder (2005) and Forster (2011), I ar-
gue that onWhewell’s account, induction should be understood as an ampliative
model-building procedure that is successful if the abstract objects that it creates
have “the same” structure as found in the world.2 As such, this procedure is use-
fully seen as akin to the semantic view of theories in the way that it presents an
alternative to the more sentence- or proposition-focused accounts of induction
prevalent in twentieth-century debates. Not only does this comparison help us
make sense of Whewell’s explicit comments on induction; it also illuminates
other aspects of his philosophy of science. In the ﬁnal section, I turn to two
well-known characteristics of his epistemology of science—the value of con-
silience and the justiﬁcatory importance of the order of discovery—to argue that
both align with this “semantic” account of induction in a way that they do not
with the contrasting “syntactic” picture.
Before beginning, however, a brief note.Whewell was clearly concerned with
the nature of theories and the proper understanding of their representative
character (see, e.g., Whewell 1840/2014a, xli) and equally if not more concerned
with howwe justify these representations (see, e.g.,Whewell 1840/2014a, xxxix–
xl). He shared these concerns with predecessors such as Thomas Reid (1785/
1941, 33, 58) and Kant (1786/2004, 4–6), opponents such as Mill (1868/
2012, bk. 3), and philosophically inclined scientists such as John Herschel
(1830/1966, 164–70) and James Clerk Maxwell, famous for his use of alter-
native means to represent physical phenomena.3 The framing of these ques-
tions in terms of a debate between syntactic and semantic accounts of theories
is a twentieth-century phenomenon, however, and it would be a mistake to
assimilate these authors to it, something that I have no intention of doing.
My use of terms like “semantic” and “syntactic” in this essay is meant to help
us understand, by way of comparison, the difference between Whewell’s unfa-
miliar views on induction and more familiar ones; it is similar to the difference
between semantic and syntactic accounts of theories. As we will see, the compar-
ison is fruitful, but it pays to remember that Whewell and his contemporaries
understood the relevant issues within a framework dramatically different from
our own.2. Of course, I do not think that Whewell has in mind anything like the truth-making function of
mathematical models sometimes associated with the semantic view of theories. See Thomson-Jones
(2006) for discussion of the different senses of “model” at use in semantic views.
3. For the inﬂuence of Kant and Scottish common sense philosophy onWhewell, see Snyder (2006,
esp. 46). For Whewell’s inﬂuence on Maxwell, see Harman (1998, esp. 32–36).
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A2. Whewell’s Philosophy of Science
For Whewell (1840/2014a, 3), a ﬁnished philosophy of science would offer “a
complete insight into the essence and conditions of all real knowledge, and an
exposition of the best methods for the discovery of new truths.”The ﬁrst part of
this project is determining the nature of scientiﬁc knowledge. On his account,
any and all knowledge of the empirical world involves both passive and active
capacities of the mind (26). Passively, the mind takes in sensations produced by
the external world. These sensations are not merely received, however, and
Whewell is clear that there cannot be any sort of knowledge on the basis of sen-
sation alone. Even “recogniz[ing] any single body as existing” (26) requires ac-
tively “imposing” ideas on the sensations that are given to us. The ideas imposed
on our sensations reﬂect the conditions of the world, not internal facts about
our minds. As Snyder (2008, 170) puts it, they “provide the general relations
that really exist in the world between objects and events.”
If knowledge is the combination of ideas and sensations, induction—the
“best method” (Whewell 1840/2014a, 4) for reaching knowledge—is the act
of combining ideas with sensations. On Whewell’s account, this act is broken
into two major inseparable “operations” of the sciences, the explication of ideas
and the colligation of facts (1840/2014b, 212).4 The ﬁrst of these two operations
involves the extension and clariﬁcation of ideas, the second the application of an
idea to the world such that the facts are properly united in the resulting mental
construction. It is important that these two processes are inseparable: at least in
practice, fully developing all of our ideas before attempting to apply them to the
world is impossible. Instead, explication seems to be largely a matter of repeated
attempts to unite the facts under an idea (225). For Whewell, an explicit def-
inition of an idea is a useful if unnecessary end to the process of explication
(179), and such deﬁnitions are typically the product of a successful colligation
(219)—we usually come to a proper deﬁnition of an idea only through wres-
tling with the empirical facts that we are using it to unify.
Given that Whewell views knowledge as the successful combination of ideas
with sensations, it is no surprise that he understands induction primarily as a
process that produces this type of combination of passive and active elements.
More idiosyncratic than his understanding of the results of this process is Whe-4. Near the beginning of vol. 1 of The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell (1840/2014a,
xliii) lists three “steps” rather than the two “operations”: “the Selection of Idea, the Construction of the
Conception, and the Determination of the Magnitudes.” I do not believe that these two characterizations
conﬂict. As I read him, the description in terms of operations is a more abstract account of the justi-
ﬁcatory process, while the three “steps” describe temporal stages of that process. Regardless, the two
operations have a much larger role in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.
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Awell’s understanding of the process itself. One familiar method for introducing
students to induction is via schemas of the form “All observed x’s have property
P ; therefore, all x’s have P ” or “All observed x’s have property P ; therefore, the
next x will have property P.” At least superﬁcially, what makes these examples
inductive is the move from observed instances to the further conclusion. For
Whewell (1840/2014a, 66), however, the proper form of the induction is bet-
ter expressed in terms of the uniﬁcation of the idea of x and the idea of P into a
general proposition (Px) and the use of this new idea to characterize the ob-
served facts. Notice that while this vision of induction does involve the uniﬁ-
cation of particular facts (Whewell 1840/2014a, xl), it does not involve an in-
ference from a claim about particulars to a general fact. Instead, the general fact
is constituted by the impression of the idea on the particulars (1840/2014b,
213). As such, Whewell’s induction differs dramatically from familiar accounts
of deductive or syllogistic inferences: an inductive inference is not just deduc-
tive inference where entailment fails; it is something altogether different.3. Whewell’s Semantic Account of Induction
In order to bring out the unique aspects of Whewell’s account of induction, it
will be helpful to have on hand an opposing account in which inductive and
deductive reasoning are more closely related—that is, one in which an induc-
tive inference is like a deductive inference but ampliative or probabilistic (or
both) rather than deductively valid. For our purposes, Carnap (1962) provides
a useful foil.5 There are three central theses of his view that I want to focus on:
(1) Both the premises and conclusions of an inductive inference are
propositional or sentential.
(2) Inductive reasoning (in the sense relevant to the epistemology of sci-
ence) is characterized by failure of the premises to entail the conclusion.
(3) “Strength,” the inductive analogue of validity, is a function of the log-
ical relation between the premises and the conclusion.
While each of these theses is drawn directly from Carnap (speciﬁcally Carnap
1962, v), I take it that they are relatively widely endorsed or at least seen as a5. In all but one respect: Carnap uses the term “semantic” in the logical sense of involving an in-
terpreted formalism, and his account of both deduction and induction is semantic in this sense. By con-
trast, we are using “semantic” in the sense of more recent debates in philosophy of science: i.e., an ac-
count is semantic if it gives pride of place to abstract models rather than linguistic statements. It might
therefore be preferable to term Whewell’s view “model-centric” and foil “deductivist,” but these terms
have their own burdens and lack the clear connection to the present literature that I ﬁnd illuminating.
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Apart of an intuitive package from which alternative accounts (such as Harman
1965, Kyburg 1990, or Norton 2003) depart.6 I will call the family of accounts
exempliﬁed by Carnap the “syntactic” view of induction owing to the emphasis
that the three theses place on formal linguistic structures. As we will see, Whe-
well rejects all three, and I will argue that he does so in a way that is usefully un-
derstood by comparison with the semantic theorist’s rejection of the syntactic
accounts of theories.
Starting with thesis 1, we have already seen that the elements of Whewell’s
induction are distinctly not sentences or propositions: the “premises” always
include both facts and an idea that is then superimposed upon them (1840/
2014a, 26). What are these components? For Whewell, a fact is an abstract ob-
ject composed of sensations (or other facts) and an idea such that the idea gives
form to the matter that is the sensations (31). As noted earlier, it is impossible
to be given a sensation without its form, and Whewell thinks that the sole dis-
tinction between what we call a “fact” and what we call a “theory” is that we are
aware that we have impressed an idea in the latter case (24).7 In other words, in-
duction takes in some facts—roughly, sensations that are given form by ideas—
and uniﬁes them under a new idea, showing that they share a common form.Or,
to put it in termsWhewell would not use, an induction takes in abstract objects
that are structured in certain ways and constructs a new, unifying abstract object
by imposing additional structure.
The result of this process is a new fact, and Whewell (1840/2014b, 181) is
not willing to guarantee that this abstract object will be expressible in language
available to the scientist. Instead, he seems to understand it as a mental construc-
tion, and an induction is successful if the facts are united in “the same” man-
ner in our construction as they are in the world (210). The criteria for same-
ness are underdeveloped in Whewell’s account. It is clearly not isomorphism,
but the exact metaphysical relationship is not spelled out in detail anywhere that
I am aware of. Nevertheless, he does seem to have in mind something similar to
the view defended by semantic accounts of theories: our theorizing is successful
when wementally combine (the right) facts in “the same” relationship that these6. As one reviewer rightly stressed, it is not clear that this combination of principles retains this
special status. Given the increased popularity of accounts that reduce induction to IBE along the lines
suggested by Gilbert Harman, in particular, it is likely that the package is less prevalent today than it was
a few decades ago.
7. While I will use both “theory” and “fact” in largely standard ways throughout the essay, this
equivalence should be remembered. Where I intend to indicate speciﬁcally that a fact/theory uniﬁes
other facts (rather than sensations), I will contrast the unifying “higher-level theory” to the uniﬁed “lower-
level fact,” but these phrases should be understood as contextual to a particular inductive uniﬁcation.
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Afacts have in the world. In the contemporary terms appealed to in the last par-
agraph, a successful induction creates a model of what really exists in the world
rather than a true sentence. For Whewell, therefore, none of the elements of an
induction are propositional: induction combines sensations with ideas like curve
or ellipse to produce a mental representation—a fact or theory—of the world
that may or may not be exactly expressed in the available language.8
An example is helpful, and Whewell provides one in the form of “inductive
tables” in volume 2 of The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.9 On the broadest
level, these tables proceed from phenomena (e.g., “The Tides ebb and ﬂow”) to
theory (“All bodies attract each other with a Force of Gravity which is inversely
as the square of the distances”), just as one would expect, given Whewell’s ex-
plicitly inductive methodological viewpoint. More interesting are the elements
between the predictable extremes, where Whewell includes inferences such as
“Fall of heavy bodies [implies that] Earth attracts Moon invers. as square of dis-
tance (Newton)” and “Two Rhombs of Calcspar make 4 images alternately ap-
pear and disappear [implies that] Rays of light have four Sides with regard to
which their properties alternate (Huyghens).”10 Obviously, these inferences are
not intended to be simple relationships between sentences or propositions. On
my interpretation, the premises (which are sometimes simply “By mechanics”)
give reasons to unify certain facts under a particular idea. Within a framework
in which it has already been established that a force is directing the moon toward
the earth, the “fall of heavy bodies” provides reason to model the motion of the
moon according to an inverse-square attraction. Or, more inWhewell’s terminol-
ogy, the fall of heavy bodies reveals the ﬁt between the fact of the motion of the
moon and the idea of an inverse-square attraction, giving a good reason to impress
this idea on the facts.
The second characteristic of the syntactic view of induction (thesis 2) is that
induction is deﬁned by its nondeductive nature. Given a focus on entailment
between sentences or propositions, there are only two possible types of inference:
those that involve entailment and those that do not. For Whewell, by contrast,
induction is not best understood as an inference from one sentence or set of sen-
tences to another. Instead, as we have seen, induction is better understood as a
type of uniﬁcation of various facts under a single idea to create a new fact. On
this picture, the old facts are part of the new one in the sense of being constitu-8. For Whewell, this is in contrast to deductive reasoning, which requires that the ideas be expressed
in the form of axioms and deﬁnitions (1840/2014a, 89).
9. The tables occur between pp. 282 and 283 in my copy. They are also largely unreadable. For-
tunately, Cambridge provides scans of the originals at cambridge.org/9781108064033 (under “Re-
sources”).
10. I have altered Whewell’s presentation by substituting “[implies that]” for a horizontal line.
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Aent pieces. In other words, the nature of induction is more modeling procedure
than it is inference ticket: when we perform an induction, we create a newmodel
out of a group of old models by bringing them together to constitute some-
thing new.
It needs to be stressed that Whewell’s vision of induction is still ampliative
in the sense that the new fact always goes beyond the observed facts that con-
stitute it (1840/2014b, 214; cf. Snyder 2008). Whewell’s own example illus-
trates the point adeptly. When Kepler superinduces an ellipse on Mars’s orbit,
Whewell regards his action as one of judging how to represent this orbit within
a mathematical system in which the idea of an ellipse has certain necessary con-
nections with other mathematical ideas. Generally, the ideas that we impose on
facts already stand in certain relationships with other abstract objects—they are
part of larger abstract structures. The idea imposed therefore uniﬁes more than
the observed facts; as Whewell (1840/2014a, 242) puts it, to impose an idea
is to take it to be “universally valid.” In our example, Kepler’s uniﬁcation of the
positions of Mars’s orbit under the idea of ellipse creates a structure that brings
together not just the facts about observed positions but also facts about future
positions.Whewellian induction is ampliative, therefore, because the model cre-
ated when an idea is superinduced on facts always represents more of the world
than has been observed.
The ﬁnal characteristic of the syntactic view (thesis 3) is that strength is a
function of the logical relations between the premises and the conclusion. Just
as the validity of a syllogism is independent of its content, the strength of an in-
duction is independent of whether we are generalizing about swans or ravens.
The strength of a simple enumerative induction, for example, might be a func-
tion of the ratio between the size of the sample and the size of the population. Of
course, content independence alone leaves quite a bit of room for disagreement
about which properties characterize a strong induction. For Carnap (1962, v),
strength ought to be a measurement of the probability of the conclusion rela-
tive to the probability of the premises. For Goodman (1979, 64), by contrast,
a strong inductive schema is just one of a set of inductive rules that do not lead
to contradictions.
For Whewell, neither of these conceptions of strength is even applicable to
induction, as there is no one schema or general rule involved in multiple induc-
tive inferences (1840/2014a, 66); nor, for that matter, does induction involve
logical relations between sentences that can be characterized in this manner.
Given that the essence of an induction is the application of a new idea to the
facts—in contemporary terms, the creation of a new abstract object by the im-
position of additional structure—the strength of an induction is primarily a
function of the ﬁt between the new idea applied and the facts. That is, it is pri-000
This content downloaded from 129.074.250.206 on March 09, 2018 12:51:54 PM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Dethier | S PR ING 2018
Amarily a function of whether the ideas are ﬁt together in “the same” way in the
idea as in the observed facts. Whewell’s Kepler example is again helpful. What
made Kepler’s induction to elliptical orbits strong was not a relation between
sentences but rather the “exact and universal accordance” between the idea of
an ellipse and the observed facts (Whewell 1840/2014b, 169).
Whewell does not think that strength is only a function of ﬁt, however, as he
goes on to indicate in the sentence following the one just quoted. How well the
imposition of the idea is supported by the rest of theory matters as well. A com-
parison with John Norton’s “material induction” can help clarify this aspect of
Whewell’s thought. Like Whewell, Norton (2003, 650) denies that the induc-
tive schema bears the burden of justifying a particular induction, relocating that
justiﬁcation to what he calls the “material postulate,” which provides indepen-
dent grounds for surety about the inference. Norton’s material postulates are the
results of prior science; to borrow one of his examples, we are muchmore secure
in inductions relating to the melting temperature of elements than inferences
regarding the color of fowl because we bring to these inductions knowledge
about chemical kinds and animal pigmentation gained from prior inductions.
The strength of the inductive inference thus depends on what we know about
the kind that the induction is being applied to (cf. Snyder 2005, 130). While
Whewell’s ideas outrun Norton’s explicit examples of material postulates rather
dramatically (Snyder 2005, 131), there is a similarity: forWhewell, the strength
of an induction depends on whether the abstract object produced can itself be
uniﬁed to produce higher-level abstract objects, that is, whether we can show
that elements in general have consistent melting temperatures. In the Kepler
example, this effect is achieved when we show that Mars’s elliptical orbit is not
unique or accidental but is part of a larger pattern common to all planetary or-
bits. While an induction is judged ﬁrst on the ﬁt between the idea and facts—
how accurate the resulting model is—we can only really be sure of an inductive
conclusion once its place in a whole system of supporting inductions has been
identiﬁed (Whewell 1840/2014b, 169, 255; cf. Norton 2003, 668).
I have argued that Whewell rejects all three of the theses that I identiﬁed
with the syntactic view of induction. As we have seen, he replaces them with
the following:
(4) The knowledge resulting from a successful induction is a model that
represents a part of the world by uniting the facts under the “same”
relationships that they really stand in.
(5) An induction is deﬁned by the ampliative imposition of an idea on the
facts to create a new fact in which the old facts serve as constitutive
parts.000
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A(6) The epistemic burden of justifying an inductive conclusion rests ﬁrst
on the ﬁt between the speciﬁc idea and the facts and second on the ﬁt
of the conclusion in the broader model of related phenomena.
Given the nature of these three commitments, I think it is fair to call Whewell’s
view “semantic” owing to its likeness to the familiar position on the nature of
theories: on my reading, he presents a view of induction that differs from more
familiar accounts precisely in its focus on model building rather than logical
relationships between sentences. Nevertheless, the method is still recognizable
as induction. Although the ampliative and justiﬁcatory nature of induction is
transformed by Whewell’s approach, these characteristics remain central to his
vision: the model generated by an induction goes beyond the facts and, if the
induction is a good one, ought to be endorsed.
I think the picture presented above is accurate toWhewell’s views, albeit pre-
sented in terms that he would not necessarily understand, let alone use. Still,
the account should be understood as one that reﬂects my interests in this article:
it leaves out signiﬁcant aspects of his views, particularly relating to hypotheses,
fundamental ideas, and God. There is much more to Whewell’s philosophy of
science than the views discussed above. In the rest of the article, I will show that
the contrast between his semantic view and the more familiar syntactic one can
help us understand and unify some of these other elements of Whewell’s thought
as well. In particular, I argue that two important characteristics of his epistemol-
ogy—the value of consilience and the justiﬁcatory importance of the order of
discovery—are better aligned with the semantic view of induction than they
would be with the more familiar syntactic understanding.4. Semantic Induction and Whewell’s Epistemology of Science
4.1. Consilience
One of the interesting consequences of Whewell’s (1849, 23) view that facts
and theories are essentially the same is that any established theory can be used
as a fact to be united under a new idea. The resulting layering of inductions is a
nice instance of what Whewell has in mind in his discussions of consilience (see,
e.g., Whewell 1840/2014b, 230; 1849, 61). Suppose we perform an induction
on the observations of Mars by “superinducing” the concept of an ellipse onto
its positions in the night sky. This process is itself a single induction that (if suc-
cessful) establishes a true fact: the revolution of Mars is elliptical. Further sep-
arate inductions can be performed on the other planets, establishing that each
has an elliptical orbit as well. These inductive inferences support each other—000
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Athey are consilient—when we can make an additional induction that uniﬁes
them to show that planets in general revolve in ellipses (see Whewell 1840/
2014b, 242–43). This instance of consilience, as Forster (2011, 94) stresses,
is an example of bootstrapping in which the success of the lower-level induction
is supported or conﬁrmed by the higher-level one. In other words, the higher-
level theory can provide support to the lower-level induction by showing that
the resulting facts ﬁt into predictable and generalizable patterns.
Consilience based on different levels of facts is not the only type of consilience
that Whewell recognizes. The fact that the same inverse-square gravitational re-
lationship can be used to account for a variety of different phenomena is another
example that he is particularly fond of (Whewell 1840/2014b, 230–31; see also
Snyder 2005, 132–33). As Forster (2011, 105) notes, the uniting theme is the
use of phenomena or aspects of phenomena that were not appealed to in estab-
lishing the original induction or inductions. In our example, the nature of Mars
qua planet is not invoked in the original inference to elliptical orbits; this aspect
is not employed as a reason for believing that its motion is elliptical. So, an in-
duction that establishes that planets in general move in ellipses offers further ev-
idence in support of our original induction by providing an additional reason to
believe that Mars revolves in an ellipse—namely, the fact that it is a planet and
that planets in general have elliptical revolutions.
On the syntactic view, consilience has no built-in role to play in an inductive
inference, as the strength of an induction is simply a function of the logical re-
lation between the evidence and the conclusion.11 Since consilience involves
mutual support among a variety of different inductive inferences or conclu-
sions, it is necessarily external to this relation. In our example, our inferences re-
lating to each orbit are mutually supporting because in each case we ﬁnd that the
orbit is elliptical, but this does not alter the ﬁt between the idea and the facts
being uniﬁed.Here, it is essential to remember that induction, forWhewell, also
involves the explication of ideas. That an idea ﬁts a limited range of facts does not
ensure that it is the right idea to impress on those facts. Finding that the same idea
has purchase in a variety of applications, by contrast, indicates that the process of
explication has gone correctly. As such, it provides independent, albeit indirect,
support to the original inductive uniﬁcation by indicating that the idea imposed
was a good one, that is, that we successfully identiﬁed a genuine regularity or
(what we might now call) a natural kind (cf. Snyder 2005, 138). Or: the fact that
there is a common structure unifying the abstract models that we use to represent
the world gives us indirect evidence that each one of these models is accurate by11. Which is not to say that it is impossible for a sophisticated syntactic account to recover this role,
as Myrvold (2003) attempts to do.
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Aproviding us with evidence that our choice of model has not been inﬂuenced by
arbitrary or parochial aspects of the particular phenomena being represented. Not
only does consilience ﬁt nicely with the semantic view’s claim that inductive con-
clusions are further evidenced by being uniﬁedwithin higher-level or broader the-
ories; it also helps explain why the defender of semantic induction would see this
condition as important. If the emphasis is on the ﬁt between the idea and the
world, rather than the pure logical connections, the content of the idea (and thus
getting the content of the idea right) is evidentially relevant.124.2. The Justiﬁcatory Importance of the Order of Discovery
The second aspect of Whewell’s general epistemology of science that I wish to
place emphasis on is his belief in what I will term the justiﬁcatory importance of
the order of discovery, which played a central role in his famous disagreement
with John Stuart Mill. In A System of Logic, Mill (1868/2012, 500) states that
“if the supposition accords with the phenomena there needs no other evidence
of it,” seemingly endorsing the idea that the origins of a hypothesis are irrelevant
when it comes to testing whether or not it is true (cf. Mill 1868/2012, 496).13
Whewell takes issue with this claim, but his response is obscure: he states that
this view “is tainted with the vice . . . of throwing the whole burthen of expla-
nation on the unexplained word fact—unexplained in any permanent and def-
inite opposition to theory” (1849, 62–63). What does the notion of “fact” have
to do with whether or not it is valid to conﬁrm a hypothesis by way of its pre-
dictions? Consilience—notably, the topic Whewell discusses on either side of
this passage (see Whewell 1849, 61, 65)—offers a hint. As we noted above,
the layering of inductions on top of each other can provide indirect support
for the inductions on the lower level, and Whewell (1840/2014b, 244–45) is
clear that the support provided by consilience is crucial to the veriﬁcation of
higher-level scientiﬁc theories such as Newtonian gravity. In effect, as Forster
(2011, 104) again points out, the structure of induction on top of induction12. For a more thorough discussion of Whewell’s views on the development of ideas in the context of
a speciﬁc scientiﬁc example, see Cobb (2011, particularly 88–89). My thanks to an anonymous reviewer
for pointing out that the example employed in an earlier version of this paragraph was misleading.
13. I do not mean to imply that Mill held what I have been calling a syntactic view of induction. It
is an interesting question whether the other major inductivists whomWhewell was familiar with—e.g.,
Bacon, Mill, Newton, or Reid (see Reid 1785/1941, 31)—held views accurately characterized by either
side of the dichotomy that I have presented. Unfortunately, that question is outside the scope of this
essay; my focus in this section is on arguing that Whewell’s response to Mill can be understood as part
of his broader semantic view on induction. For a more thorough examination of this debate and what is
at stake within it, see Snyder (2008), Cobb (2011), or Forster (2011).
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Agives the theory additional empirical predictions. ForWhewell,Newtonian grav-
ity uniﬁes (and thus makes predictions about) more than observed positions. It
also makes predictions about the characteristics of planets, comets, aphelia, and
so on, as kinds, as Snyder (2005) argues. To simply hypothesize this theory and
then test it ignores or at least obscures the structure of the theory and thus fails to
independently test or conﬁrm these crucial predictions (Snyder 2005, 135–36;
cf. Whewell 1831, 399–400).
Whewell’s main objection, therefore, is epistemological: he thinks that there
is an important epistemic difference between testing a theory through his in-
ductive method and “testing” a hypothesis merely by way of a comparison of its
consequences with the facts. So, why does he say that the latter picture rests on
a mistaken view of facts? Recall that Whewell thinks that there is no difference
in kind between facts and theories—both are the uniﬁcation of sensations and
ideas. Indeed, higher-level “theories” are constituted by inductions on lower-
level facts: effectively, the former model includes the latter as parts that it unites
together under a single idea. What Whewell objects to in Mill is what he reads
as the denial of this constitutive relationship in favor of an opposition between
theory and fact (“phenomena” in Mill’s terms) in which one is tested against the
other. Given the constitutive relationship between higher- and lower-level facts,
by contrast, what actually needs to be tested are the inductions that bring the
facts together at every level. Or, asWhewell (1840/2014b, 245) puts it, the only
way to test a general theory is by “testing, at each step, both the reality of the
asserted ingredients and the propriety of the conjunction.”14 The structured
view of justiﬁcation just outlined is what I have in mind when I attribute to
Whewell the view that the order of discovery has justiﬁcatory importance. The
justiﬁcation of a theory is necessarily piecemeal: it can only proceed through
the conﬁrmation of each induction, step by step. The obvious implication is that
we cannot proceed by hypothesizing a higher-level theory and then conﬁrming
the whole of it by the comparison of its consequences with observed phenomena.
For Whewell, the nonpiecemeal procedure is unacceptable because it leaves
the lower-level inductions untested: it does not check whether we have identi-
ﬁed the correct ideas or merely developed a model that replicates the most su-
perﬁcial empirical features (Whewell 1831, 400). As was true with consilience,
there is nothing about a syntactic induction that allows for his privileging of the14. For Whewell, in other words, higher-level theories are conﬁrmed in precisely the same way as
lower-level facts are: we check whether the facts that are purported to be uniﬁed by the impression of
the new idea are in fact uniﬁed. What differs is that a lower-level fact might unify only sensations, while
a higher-level theory uniﬁes many facts, which themselves may also unify facts. In order to properly test
the higher-level theory, therefore, we need to ensure that the “facts” being uniﬁed are themselves verid-
ical. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this issue.
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Aorder of discovery. Indeed, on the syntactic account, it makes no difference
whether the original inference to the inductive conclusion is conﬁrmed or if
some other consequence of the theory is. In both cases, the degree of conﬁrma-
tion is to be judged purely on the logical merits of the relation between sentences
alone; syntactic inductions are insensitive to the order of discovery. On Whe-
well’s semantic account, by contrast, insensitivity is impossible. Whewell rejects
Mill’s position because he thinks that theories are constituted by facts rather than
tested against them. In contemporary terms, facts and theories are abstract ob-
jects, and higher-level theories such as Newtonian mechanics are just abstract
objects that have other abstract objects as parts. While a theory can thus gain
indirect support through the testing of any of its implications, it can only be
properly conﬁrmed by examining whether the facts that serve as its parts are both
veridical and properly uniﬁed (Whewell 1840/2014b, 245). Since the order of
discovery determines what these constitutive elements are, the order of discovery
is extremely relevant to the justiﬁcation of a theory (Whewell 1831, 400–401).
To put this another way, although many think that the piecemeal testing of
each aspect of a theory is impossible, everyone agrees that it would be better if
we could test theories in this manner. On the syntactic view of induction, how-
ever, there is no built-in beneﬁt to piecemeal testing; the beneﬁt is external to
the logic of conﬁrmation, arising only when it comes time to jettison some part
of an unsuccessful theory. For Whewell, by contrast, the beneﬁts of piecemeal
testing are built into the logic of conﬁrmation, although, of course, it is not
quite a “logic” in a narrow sense. Because a higher-level theory like Newtonian
gravity is a semantic induction on the various facts established by other induc-
tions, there is no possible way to verify the ﬁt of this higher-level induction ex-
cept by conﬁrming its ﬁt with facts established by previous inductions, which
means examining each prior induction to determine just what those facts are.
For this reason, piecemeal testing is obligatory, and the order of discovery is ab-
solutely essential to the logic of conﬁrmation, as the order determines what as-
pects of the world our theory must successfully unify in order to survive the test.5. Conclusion
In this article, I have compared Whewell’s views on induction to a more famil-
iar contemporary picture—the “syntactic” view of induction I drew from Car-
nap—and argued that there is a substantial disagreement between them. A nat-
ural reaction to this disagreement would be to declare that in our sense of the
word, Whewell’s “induction” is not induction at all; we can best understand his
account of induction by linking it to some other contemporary account of jus-
tiﬁcation, such as hypothetico-deductivism or IBE. What I have tried to show000
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Ain this essay, however, is that the difference between Whewell’s account and
contemporary views is better understood by comparison with the debates be-
tween syntactic and semantic views about theories. Where contemporary
accounts generally think of induction as involving logical relations among sen-
tences,Whewell’s induction is a type ofmodel-building practice: both the induc-
tive method that he champions and the picture of the resulting scientiﬁc knowl-
edge should be understood in terms of constructing a model of the world in the
sense of developing an abstract representation. This reading coheres nicely with
his broader epistemology. In particular, his views on the consilience and the or-
der of discovery share a natural ﬁt with the semantic picture of induction that
they do not have with the more familiar syntactic one.RE FERENCES
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